The public sector pay premium and compensating differentials in the New Zealand labour market by Gibson, John
 UNIVERSITY OF WAIKATO 
Hamilton 
New Zealand 
 
 
The Public Sector Pay Premium and  
Compensating Differentials  
in the New Zealand Labour Market 
 
John Gibson 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
Working Paper in Economics 20/07 
October 2007 
 
John Gibson 
 
Economics Department 
University of Waikato 
Private Bag 3105 
Hamilton 
New Zealand 
 
Tel: +64 (0) 7-838-4045 
Email: jkghibson@waikato.ac.nz 
Web: http://www.mngt.waikato.ac.nz 
 
 
  
 
 
Abstract 
In this note, propensity score matching (PSM) methods are applied to data from the 2005 
International Social Survey Program Work Orientations (ISSP-WO) survey to examine the 
public sector pay premium in New Zealand. Taking account of a wide range of worker 
characteristics and attitudes, job attributes, and the effects that jobs have on workers and their 
family life, there appears to be a pay premium from working in the public sector of 17 to 21 
percent. 
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I. Introduction 
The rising public sector wage bill is a key feature of the New Zealand labour market. This 
reflects not only the growth of the public sector,1 but also improvements in remuneration for 
public sector workers. For example, according to the Quarterly Employment Survey (QES), 
for the decade prior to the current Labour Government’s election in 1999 average private 
sector wages were at least 80% of those in the public sector. Since then there has been a 
steady decline in pay parity, with average private sector wages being below 75% of public 
sector wages since 2005.2 There have also been improvements in non-wage benefits for the 
public sector, including the State Sector Retirement Savings Scheme which since 2005 has 
provided 3% matching employer contributions to employee retirement savings; well before 
and well above the level of employer contributions for other workers under KiwiSaver. 
 
 Some analysts have suggested that this rising remuneration for public sector workers 
reflects an asymmetry in employment relations between the public and private sectors. Since 
governments have statutory power to raise taxes, with large tax surpluses in the recent New 
Zealand case, they may not face the same financial pressures that inhibit wage rises in many 
private firms. This asymmetry also reflects the difficulty for taxpayers, who are the ultimate 
employer of public servants, to ensure that they are well represented in the wage negotiation 
process (Grimmond, 2007). Moreover, bureaucrats may have both a supply and demand role 
since they can influence the size of public sector employment, and hence face less of a trade-
off between wage increases and employment than do other workers (Dahlberg and Mörk, 
2006). Finally, since many public sector services are essential, an inelastic product demand 
contributes to inelastic labour demand, providing more scope for union activity to raise public 
sector pay. Therefore, it is unsurprising that unions have higher membership rates in the 
public sector than the private sector (Gregory and Borland, 1999). 
 
 However, improvements in the relative pay of public sector workers may also reflect 
changes in skill demands and job attributes between public and private sectors. These 
differences in job attributes have been found to account for much of the pay difference 
                                                
1  According to Statistics New Zealand’s Labour Market Statistics 2006 there were 45,000 more full-
time public sector employees in March 2006 than in March 2000. This growth of 24.7 percent 
compares with 22.7 percent in the private sector.  The details can be found at:  
 http://www.stats.govt.nz/analytical-reports/labour-market-statistics-06.htm  
2  These averages are for ordinary time hourly earnings of both sexes combined (INFOS codes: 
EESQ.SASG9A (public) and EESQ.SASH9A (private)) and are reported in Grimmond (2007). 
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between public and private sectors in the U.K. (Bender and Elliott, 2002). However, other 
studies find that fringe benefits, such as holiday allowances, job security and pension 
schemes, are more generous for public sector workers (e.g., Poterba and Rueben, 1998), and 
that overall job satisfaction is higher (Demoussis and Giannakopoulos, 2007) so 
compensating differentials would imply lower public sector wages to offset these more 
favourable job conditions.  
 
 Since workers may choose to work in the sector that best suits their mix of observable 
and unobservable characteristics, any evaluation of the net advantages of public sector 
employment also needs to take such selection into account. For example, Bellante and Link 
(1981) find that public sector employees are more risk averse than their private sector 
counterparts. Therefore statistical methods used to estimate the public sector pay premium 
should compare public sector workers only with similar workers from other sectors. Such a 
comparison also should control for differences in productivity-related characteristics and in 
the positive and negative features of jobs that give rise to compensating pay differentials. 
 
 In this note, propensity score matching (PSM) methods are applied to data from the 2005 
International Social Survey Program Work Orientations (ISSP-WO) survey to examine the 
public sector pay premium in New Zealand. These PSM methods involve matching public 
sector workers to similar workers in other sectors to estimate the public sector pay premium 
once worker and job characteristics are controlled for. The ISSP-WO data are uniquely suited 
to this purpose since in addition to recording sector of employment and standard 
characteristics like age, education, gender and ethnicity they also record job attributes such as 
stress, insecurity, and interference with family life. The other main surveys for studying 
workers in New Zealand (the Income Survey, formerly known as the Income Supplement to 
the Household Labour Force Survey, and the three-yearly Household Economic Survey) do 
not record sector of employment and have no details on job characteristics. 
 
II. Data 
ISSP Work Orientations Survey 
The ISSP surveys are carried out each year in approximately 30 countries, with a common set 
of questions asked of a probability-based, nationwide sample of adults. The topics of the 
survey change each year, with work orientations previously studied in 1989 (when New 
Zealand did not participate) and in 1997 (when the coding for sector of employment appeared 
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to be different to other years).3 In each participating country, samples of between 1000 and 
2000 adults are collected, with 1309 respondents in the New Zealand survey. While the ISSP 
data are often used for labour market studies (for example, see Sousa-Poza and Henneberger 
(2002)) they have not previously been used in New Zealand. Moreover, the results from the 
2005 ISSP-WO have only recently become available to researchers. 
 
Descriptive Comparisons of Public Sector Workers and Job Attributes  
The ISSP-WO data include detailed information on the characteristics of respondents and 
their general attitudes to work. For those working for pay, their job attributes and the effect of 
their main job on the respondent and their family life are also recorded. The attitudinal and 
job attribute variables are recorded using five-point Likert scales. A description of these four 
sets of characteristics for public sector workers and other workers is reported in Table 1. The 
sample is restricted to those respondents that were working for pay at the time of the survey 
and had non-missing values for all of the variables in Table 1 (n=786). 
 
 There are a number of differences between public sector workers and other workers in 
both observable characteristics and attitudes. The public sector workers are more highly 
educated (by 1.3 years on average), are more likely to be female (70% versus 46%) and to 
reside in the Wellington region. They are also more likely to believe that an important feature 
of a job is that it is useful to society. However, contrary to previous overseas findings (for 
example, Bellante and Link (1981)), there is no significant difference across sectors in 
workers’ attitudes to job security. 
 
 The attributes of jobs and their effects on workers and their family life also differ 
significantly between sectors. Public sector workers are more likely to find that their jobs are 
interesting, helpful to others and useful to society (in each case as evaluated by the worker 
themselves) and are less likely to do hard physical work. Offsetting these positive attributes 
of jobs, public sector workers report that they are less able to work independently, are more 
likely to find that their jobs are stressful and that their work interferes with family life.4  
 
                                                
3  Specifically, in the New Zealand component of the 1997 survey, 58% of those currently employed 
are given a code of “Not Available” for the question on sector of employment.  
4  This interference with family life does not appear to stem from any difference in work hours, with 
the mean work week reported as 37 hours by respondents in both sectors. 
  6
 Public Sector 
Workers 
Other 
Workers 
  
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
p-value 
for equal 
meansa 
Personal characteristics    
Age 43.430 12.091 42.496 13.225 0.421 
Years of education 15.289 2.518 13.969 2.804 0.000 
Male 0.296 0.458 0.536 0.499 0.000 
European/Pakeha 0.800 0.401 0.808 0.394 0.833 
Married or de facto 0.644 0.480 0.667 0.472 0.623 
Reside in Auckland region 0.200 0.401 0.287 0.453 0.025 
Reside in Wellington region 0.178 0.384 0.086 0.281 0.008 
Job attributes (1=strongly agree, 5=strongly disagree)    
My job is secure 2.193 1.096 2.316 1.046 0.160 
My job is interesting 1.867 0.853 2.077 0.850 0.005 
I can work independently 2.148 0.943 1.880 0.816 0.003 
In my job I can help others 1.659 0.693 2.071 0.855 0.000 
My job is useful to society 1.630 0.751 2.298 0.954 0.000 
Job helps improve my skills 1.956 0.929 2.077 0.905 0.110 
Effect of work on the respondent (1=always, 5=never)    
Come home exhausted 2.667 0.898 2.799 0.872 0.125 
Do hard physical work 3.859 1.094 3.498 1.276 0.002 
Find work stressful 2.704 0.865 2.998 0.864 0.000 
Face dangerous conditions 3.867 1.132 3.952 1.179 0.309 
Interferes with family life 3.237 0.940 3.421 0.976 0.037 
   
Job is just a way to earn money 3.615 1.113 3.496 1.151 0.258 
Job security is important to me 1.652 0.746 1.688 0.679 0.443 
Job helping others is important 1.896 0.756 1.994 0.708 0.127 
Job that is useful to society is 
important 
1.785 0.651 2.098 0.776 0.000 
Pre-tax annual income (log) 10.580 0.634 10.476 0.769 0.099 
      
Sample size (% of total) 135 (17.2) 651 (82.8)  
 
 
 The survey also asks respondents to report their own pre-tax yearly income from all 
sources (using ten income brackets), with an additional question on their household income. 
While there is no question on earnings, for the respondents who are currently working most 
of their annual personal income should come from labour earnings. The logarithm of annual 
income is therefore used as the proxy measure of pay in this study. This same proxy is used 
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in New Zealand studies based on Census data (e.g. Maani, 1996) and is also used in 
international comparative studies using ISSP data (e.g., Blanchflower, 1996). According to 
this proxy, the raw premium for working in the public sector is approximately 11%.5 
 
III.  Propensity Score Matching Estimates of the Public Sector Pay Premium 
Public sector workers differ from other workers in many observable and unobservable ways, 
so simple comparisons of mean earnings are unlikely to provide an unbiased estimate of the 
premium that would accrue to a given worker moving from the private to the public sector. 
While ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is a method that can control for differences in 
average characteristics, many studies show that this method is less successful at dealing with 
the sample selection problem that occurs when subjects in non-experimental studies cannot 
be randomly assigned to “treatment” and “control” groups. Such problems are relevant to 
attempts to measure the public sector pay premium since workers may choose their 
employment sector according to where their various talents will be most rewarded. 
 
 Propensity-score matching (PSM) is an increasingly popular non-experimental 
evaluation method, with proponents claiming that it can replicate experimental benchmarks 
when appropriately used (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Using PSM to estimate the public 
sector pay premium requires first estimating a probit equation for the probability of a worker 
being in the public sector. The resulting propensity score then allows each public sector 
worker to be matched only to those private sector workers whose characteristics give them 
similar predicted probabilities of being in the public sector. A comparison of the two matched 
samples then gives an estimate of the “average treatment effect” which in this case is the 
premium that would accrue to a given worker moving from the private to the public sector. In 
other words, PSM offers a way of structuring non-experimental data to look like experimental 
data, where for every subject in the “treated” group, the researcher finds comparable subjects 
in the “control” group. Several matching approaches are available, including matching each 
treated observation, i to the nearest neighbour (or neighbours) from the control group, and 
kernel matching where a weighted average of the j control group neighbours is taken with 
weights proportional to the closeness of propensity scores for i and j. 
 
                                                
5  This is calculated from the difference in the logarithm of pre-tax annual incomes (10.580-
10.476=0.104).  The percentage difference is then: 100×[exp (0.104) – 1] = 10.96%. 
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 To implement the PSM estimates of the public sector pay premium, allowing for 
differences in productivity-related characteristics and the positive and negative features of 
jobs that give rise to compensating pay differentials, a series of probit equations were 
estimated. In each case the dependent variable was an indicator variable for whether the 
ISSP-WO respondent was working in the public sector. The first probit equation explained 
this choice of employment sector using only the personal characteristics of the worker listed 
in Table 1. The resulting propensity score and matching estimates of the public sector pay 
premium therefore are only able to control for worker characteristics. The second probit 
equation includes job attributes along with personal characteristics and so gives a way of 
seeing how the estimated pay premium changes once the most obvious sources of 
compensating differentials are accounted for. The third probit equation includes the effects of 
the job on the worker and their family, which may give another source of compensating 
differentials. The fourth probit equation includes worker attitudes along with personal 
characteristics, while the fifth includes all four sets of variables (i.e., all of those described in 
Table 1). 
 
Results 
The propensity scores for public sector workers from the first probit equation, which controls 
for personal characteristics, range from 0.027 to 0.567. The propensity scores for other 
workers range from 0.002 to 0.552, and have a much lower mean. Figure 1 illustrates these in 
the form of kernel densities. It is apparent that there while some private sector workers have 
characteristics like those of public sector workers many others do not, given that the highest 
frequency of propensity scores for private sector workers occurs around 0.1, while the 
propensity scores for the majority of public sector workers are above 0.25. Therefore in all of 
the results that follow, estimation of the average treatment effect is restricted to the area of 
common support, where the two distributions overlap. Thus, private sector workers who are 
quite unlike public sector workers are not used in the comparisons. 
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Figure 1: Propensity Scores for Public Sector and Other Workers 
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 The estimates of the average treatment effect, which is the gain in log income accruing to 
a given worker moving from the private to the public sector, are reported in Table 2.6 These 
come from a kernel matching procedure where the log income of each public sector worker is 
compared with a weighted average of the log incomes of those private sector workers whose 
propensity scores are similar. To interpret the results it is useful to recall that the raw 
premium for working in the public sector is approximately 11% (based on a difference in log 
income of 0.104). 
 
 When age, education, gender, ethnicity, marital status and location are accounted for, the 
premium for working in the public sector is estimated as 13%. This is derived from a 
treatment effect for log income of 0.122. Since this is slightly larger than the raw premium it 
implies that the pay gap between the public and private sector is not due to differences in the 
average level of productivity related characteristics for the workers in each sector. 
 
                                                
6  The results of the underlying probit equations used to generate the propensity scores are in 
Appendix A. 
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Table 2: Propensity Score Matching Estimates of the Average Treatment Effect of  
Public Sector Employment on (log) Annual Income 
 
Control Variables 
Average 
Treatment 
Effect 
Bootstrapped 
Standard  
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Personal characteristics only 
(age, education, gender, ethnicity, marital 
status, location) 
0.122 (0.058) 0.002 – 0.233 
    
Personal characteristics  
+ job attributes  
(job is: secure; interesting; improves 
skills; helps others; useful to society; 
allows independent work) 
0.188 (0.084) 0.003 – 0.338 
    
Personal characteristics  
+ effects of the job on the worker 
(come home exhausted; hard physical 
work; stressful; dangerous; interferes 
with family life) 
0.122 (0.064) -0.003 – 0.226 
    
Personal characteristics 
+ worker attitudes 
(important for job to: be secure; to help 
others; be useful to society; job just a 
way to earn money) 
0.128 (0.074) -0.001 – 0.283 
    
Personal characteristics 
+ job attributes 
+ effects of the job on the worker 
+ worker attitudes 
0.158 (0.072) 0.005 – 0.295 
Source: Author’s calculations from 2005 ISSP data for New Zealand. 
 
 
 The estimated public sector pay premium is considerably larger, at 21%, when job 
attributes are also controlled for. Thus the public sector premium does not appear to be due to 
compensating differentials. Public sector workers benefit from having jobs that are more 
interesting, skill-augmenting, useful to society and helpful to others (as evaluated by the 
worker), so compensating differentials would require them to be paid less not more. Since 
they are paid more, accounting for job attributes makes the unexplained premium for working 
in the public sector even larger. 
 
 Neither the effect of jobs on the worker nor worker attitudes make much difference to the 
estimated treatment effect. Specifically, the estimated public sector pay premium is almost 
unchanged, at 13% and 13.7%, when these two sets of variables are used to calculate the 
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propensity scores in addition to personal characteristics. When all four sets of variables are 
included, the average treatment effect is 0.158, which implies that the pay premium for 
working in the public sector is 17%. Since this estimate is based on comparisons only with 
private sector workers who have similar characteristics and attitudes, and similar job 
attributes and effects, it should be a valid estimate of what a given worker would gain when 
moving from the private to the public sector. 
 
Conclusions 
This note has used data from the 2005 International Social Survey Program Work 
Orientations (ISSP-WO) survey to examine the public sector pay premium in New Zealand. 
Recent commentary has highlighted the improvement in relative remuneration in the public 
sector compared with the private sector. However, such changes might just reflect changing 
skill composition and job attributes for the public and private sector so they are not a reliable 
estimate of the pay premium that would accrue to a given worker moving to the public sector.  
 
 Therefore it is necessary to use micro data on worker characteristics and job attributes 
and an estimation method that can identify the public sector pay premium even when there is 
self-selection of workers into public or private sectors. The ISSP-WO data and propensity 
score matching techniques used here should provide reliable estimates of the public sector 
pay premium. Taking account of a wide range of worker characteristics and attitudes, job 
attributes, and the effects that jobs have on workers and their family life, there appears to be a 
pay premium of 17-21%, which is not due to compensating differentials.  
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Appendix A 
Probit Estimation Results Used to Construct Propensity Scores 
 
 Personal 
character-
istics (PC) 
PC  
+ Job 
attributes 
PC  
+ Effect of 
Work 
PC + 
Worker 
Attitudes 
All  
variables 
      
Years of education 0.120 0.119 0.110 0.135 0.129 
 (5.37)** (4.80)** (4.46)** (5.48)** (4.60)** 
Age 0.052 0.048 0.049 0.061 0.053 
 (1.74)+ (1.44) (1.48) (1.96)+ (1.61) 
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (1.29) (1.07) (1.06) (1.59) (1.19) 
Male -0.586 -0.561 -0.668 -0.559 -0.601 
 (5.08)** (4.28)** (5.20)** (4.55)** (4.26)** 
Married -0.164 -0.023 -0.141 -0.129 0.014 
 (1.27) (0.16) (1.03) (0.97) (0.09) 
Pakeha -0.143 -0.075 -0.113 -0.100 0.041 
 (0.98) (0.46) (0.72) (0.65) (0.23) 
Auckland  -0.358 -0.427 -0.383 -0.341 -0.530 
 (2.54)* (2.68)** (2.57)* (2.37)* (3.05)** 
Wellington 0.261 0.355 0.280 0.298 0.393 
 (1.52) (1.92)+ (1.55) (1.69)+ (1.94)+ 
My job is secure      
Disagree  -0.312   -0.357 
  (1.96)+   (2.21)* 
Neither agree nor disagree  -0.195   -0.197 
  (0.94)   (0.86) 
Agree  -0.352   -0.491 
  (1.51)   (1.96)* 
Strongly agree  -0.063   -0.340 
  (0.18)   (0.91) 
My job is interesting      
Disagree  -0.399   -0.480 
  (2.16)*   (2.50)* 
Neither agree nor disagree  -0.601   -0.737 
  (2.25)*   (2.68)** 
Agree  -0.395   -0.566 
  (1.06)   (1.36) 
Strongly agree  0.175   0.925 
  (0.29)   (1.69)+ 
I can work independently      
Disagree  0.571   0.597 
  (3.13)**   (2.94)** 
Neither agree nor disagree  1.170   1.128 
  (4.48)**   (3.76)** 
Agree  1.432   1.477 
  (5.25)**   (5.06)** 
In my job I can help others      
Disagree  -0.005   -0.005 
  (0.03)   (0.02) 
Neither agree nor disagree  -0.171   -0.298 
  (0.57)   (0.92) 
Agree  -0.276   -0.353 
  (0.61)   (0.86) 
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My job is useful to society      
Disagree  -0.756   -0.654 
  (3.80)**   (2.78)** 
Neither agree nor disagree  -1.282   -1.057 
  (5.12)**   (3.36)** 
Agree  -1.676   -1.356 
  (4.49)**   (3.43)** 
My job helps improve my skills      
Disagree  0.214   0.192 
  (1.19)   (1.11) 
Neither agree nor disagree  0.305   0.259 
  (1.26)   (1.00) 
Agree  0.899   1.106 
  (2.96)**   (3.20)** 
Strongly agree  -0.328   -0.356 
  (0.47)   (0.47) 
Come home exhausted      
Often   -0.084  -0.171 
   (0.32)  (0.61) 
Sometimes   -0.302  -0.319 
   (1.14)  (1.07) 
Hardly ever   -0.137  -0.076 
   (0.44)  (0.22) 
Never   -0.368  -0.436 
   (0.73)  (0.81) 
Do hard physical work      
Often   0.351  0.204 
   (0.92)  (0.54) 
Sometimes   0.712  0.754 
   (1.92)+  (2.02)* 
Hardly ever   1.094  1.124 
   (2.85)**  (3.06)** 
Never   0.950  1.110 
   (2.42)*  (2.90)** 
Find work stressful      
Often   -0.519  -0.600 
   (1.82)+  (1.89)+ 
Sometimes   -0.517  -0.570 
   (1.84)+  (1.82)+ 
Hardly ever   -0.498  -0.523 
   (1.59)  (1.47) 
Never   -1.206  -1.655 
   (2.22)*  (3.09)** 
Face dangerous conditions      
Often   -0.031  -0.179 
   (0.08)  (0.41) 
Sometimes   -0.161  -0.387 
   (0.47)  (0.95) 
Hardly ever   -0.303  -0.447 
   (0.87)  (1.07) 
Never   -0.728  -0.805 
   (2.07)*  (1.94)+ 
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Job interferes with family life 
Often   0.272  0.005 
   (0.68)  (0.01) 
Sometimes   0.322  0.147 
   (0.83)  (0.36) 
Hardly ever   0.372  0.249 
   (0.92)  (0.60) 
Never   0.147  -0.162 
   (0.34)  (0.35) 
      
Job is just a way to earn money      
Agree    0.142 0.020 
    (0.47) (0.06) 
Neither agree nor disagree    0.564 0.388 
    (1.84)+ (1.15) 
Disagree    0.166 0.027 
    (0.59) (0.09) 
Strongly disagree    0.168 -0.135 
    (0.56) (0.41) 
Job security is important to me      
Agree    -0.108 -0.148 
    (0.87) (1.05) 
Neither agree nor disagree    -0.323 -0.591 
    (1.25) (1.66)+ 
Disagree    -0.410 -0.299 
    (0.99) (0.66) 
Strongly disagree    0.744 -0.093 
    (0.83) (0.11) 
Job helping others is important      
Agree    -0.010 0.081 
    (0.06) (0.43) 
Neither agree nor disagree    0.352 0.394 
    (1.58) (1.57) 
Job useful to society is important     
Agree    -0.211 -0.133 
    (1.25) (0.72) 
Neither agree nor disagree    -0.714 -0.453 
    (3.24)** (1.79)+ 
      
      
Constant -3.525 -3.089 -3.308 -3.881 -2.985 
 (5.23)** (3.93)** (3.57)** (5.09)** (2.95)** 
Zero-slopes test (chi squared) 61.7** 177.5** 115.4** 100.0** 194.2** 
Pseudo R-squared  0.101 0.248 0.160 0.140 0.316 
Notes: 
Robust z statistics in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. N=786. 
 
The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the worker is employed in the public sector. With the exception 
of age and education, all other explanatory variables are dummy variables. Excluded category for each variable 
measured with a Likert scale is the response coded “1”, which is typically “strongly agree” or “always” depending 
on the context. Dummy variables are dropped from the estimation if they perfectly predict the dependent variable. 
 
 
